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Abstract 
 
On 22 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed 
down a judgment in the matter of Lodhi 5 Properties Investments 
CC v FirstRand Bank Limited [2015] 3 All SA 32 (SCA). This 
judgement considered whether the prohibition against the 
charging of interest on a loan in terms of Islamic law (Sharia law) 
may be a defence for a claim for mora interest in terms of a loan 
agreement. This note critically discusses the judgment in the 
light of the approach adopted by the SCA with regard to 
addressing a dispute arising from a contract that has Islamic law 
as a governing law. As this is the first case to come before the 
SCA in South Africa, this note critically analyses how the court 
discussed the principles of Islamic law as applicable to the 
dispute between the parties. In particular, it questions the court's 
assertion that a claim for mora interest has nothing to do with 
and is not affected by the Sharia law's prohibition against 
payment of interest on a loan debt. It also looks at the SCA's 
approach (as a common law court) with regard to the 
enforcement of the principles of Islamic banking law. The 
judgment raises important issues regarding the enforceability of 
Islamic finance law and therefore merits discussion in the 
context of the continuing growth and expansion of Islamic 
banking and finance law in South Africa. 
Keywords 
Islamic law; mora interest; riba; Hiyal; profit-and-loss sharing; 
Sharia; Islam. 
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1 Introduction 
An increase in the number of Muslims worldwide has been observed for 
many decades. It signals the needed for the non-Islamic world to take 
cognisance of Islamic law (also known as Sharia law) and practices. This 
has created a demand for pertinent financial transactions and services to 
comply with Islamic law. As a result, conflicts of law often arise where the 
principles of Islamic law are incorporated into the terms of financial 
agreements concluded in a secular context. Judicial officers in non-Muslim 
jurisdictions face challenges in terms of how to apply and enforce 
agreements incorporating these principles. This is particularly so with regard 
to disputes brought before secular courts in common law (and civil law) 
jurisdictions such as South Africa, where these courts are often called to 
interpret and apply, or at least to take cognisance of Islamic law. In 2015 
the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was faced with a problem of this kind 
in Lodhi 5 Properties Investments CC v FirstRand Bank Limited.1 This case 
illustrates the challenges that secular courts encounter when they are 
confronted with the interpretation and application of uncodified Sharia law, 
which has been the subject of various scholarly interpretations. It also 
illustrates the challenges encountered by common law courts with no 
expertise to interpret and enforce transactions which are subject to Sharia 
law. This lack of expertise is evident in the abovementioned case, as the 
courts - both the High Court2 (HC) and the SCA - did not address several 
issues which called for the interpretation of the relevant Islamic finance 
principles, and thus left more questions unanswered than those that were 
successfully addressed. The case raises important issues regarding the 
enforceability of Islamic finance law and merits discussion in the light of the 
continuing growth and expansion of Islamic banking and finance law in 
South Africa. The purpose of this case note is to critically analyse the 
decision in Lodhi 5 SCA in order to determine whether or not the court 
correctly applied the relevant principles of Sharia law with regard to the 
prohibition on the charging of riba interest. While the focus of this note is on 
the decision of the SCA, reference is made to the decision in the HC in order 
to illustrate the general approach of South African courts to the 
interpretation and enforcement of Islamic finance law. The discussion of the 
case note begins with a brief explication of the fundamental principles of 
                                            
*  Maphuti David Tuba. LLB (WITS) LLM (UNISA). Senior lecturer, Department of 
Mercantile Law, University of South Africa. Email: tubamd@unisa.ac.za. 
1 Lodhi 5 Properties Investments CC v First Rand Bank Limited 2015 3 All SA 32 (SCA) 
 (hereinafter "Lodhi SCA"). 
2  FirstRand Bank Ltd v Lodhi 5 Properties Investment CC 2013 3 SA 212 (GNP) 
(hereinafter "Lodhi HC"). 
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Islamic banking law in order to establish the concepts applicable to the case 
under discussion. This is followed by a description of the facts of the case 
and the decisions of the HC and, most importantly, the SCA. A critical 
analysis of the SCA decision follows thereafter, and then concluding 
remarks are made on the decision of the SCA. 
2  Fundamental principles of Islamic banking law 
Islamic law is a legal system which is derived primarily from the Quran (the 
Muslim holy book) and the Sunnah (examples of the practices of Prophet 
Mohammed).3 In terms of Islamic law conduct is either permitted (halaal) or 
strictly prohibited (haram).4 The question as to whether something is 
permitted or prohibited is not a simple one, however. Engaging in the 
following financial practices is prohibited in terms of Islamic law: gharar 
(indulging in risk or uncertainty), maysir (gambling), unjustified enrichment, 
and riba (charging interest, or usury).5 The focus of this note will be on riba, 
which forms the basis for distinguishing Islamic finance from its conventional 
counterpart. 
2.1 Riba and the charging of interest on loans 
Islamic law generally regards the charging of interest on loans as 
oppressive and exploitative, and it is therefore prohibited.6 Similar 
prohibitions on usurious interest exist in conventional banking, with the 
result that the distinction between interest and riba is sometimes blurred. 
Unlike the limited prohibition on the charging of interest found in the Bible,7 
the Quran expresses the prohibition against riba emphatically in four 
verses.8 For instance, the Quran is translated as saying: "O ye who believe! 
devour not Riba doubled and multiplied".9 However, it does not define what 
the term riba actually means. Riba literally means simply "increase, addition, 
expansion or growth",10 but in the context of financial transactions it means 
much more than that. Terms such as "effortless gain" and "profit which is 
given without giving anything in exchange" come to mind.11 Sharia law 
prohibits riba in the sense of the accumulation of wealth that is not a product 
                                            
3  Okon 2012 AJSMS 106. 
4  Visser Islamic Finance 16.  
5  Garner 2013 LJLC 72; Razak 2015 EJIF 7.  
6  Sauer "Metaphysics and Economy" 154; Alrifai Islamic Finance 117. 
7  New International Version Deuteronomy 23:19 and Nehemiah 5:10-11. 
8  Ali Holy Qur’ᾱn: Translation, Surah Al-Rum 30:39, Surah An-Nisaa 4:161, Surah Al-i-
‘Imran  3:130, Surah Al-Baqarah 2:275. 
9  Ali 1987 http://www.streathammosque.org/uploads/quran/english-quran-yusuf-ali.pdf. 
10  Chapra 1984 HI 5. 
11  Alrifai Islamic Finance 100.  
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of labour or equivalent financial value.12 A consensus among Muslim jurists 
exists that riba has the same literal meaning and import as interest.13 It is 
also agreed that it refers to some form of "premium" that must be paid to the 
creditor, along with the principal amount, as a condition for extending the 
loan, or for an extension of its maturity.14 Any positive, fixed, or 
predetermined interest rate that is tied to the maturity of the loan is 
considered as riba and is therefore prohibited.15 Muslim scholars, however, 
have not reached a consensus on the ambit of the prohibition against riba. 
This has sparked a conflict of interpretation between the two main 
categories of Muslim scholars.16 A tug-of-war on the ambit of riba exists 
between classical and modern scholars. 
The classical Muslim school follows the traditional definition of riba as any 
additional charge for borrowed money.17 They adopt the technical Arabic 
meaning of riba, which is translated as "an excess" or "increment".18 In their 
view, any additional amount charged over and above the capital originally 
advanced as a loan is simply "an act of renting money at a price called 
interest" and is therefore prohibited.19 They refute any argument that strives 
to make a distinction between simple interest (which is not prohibited) and 
usurious interest (i.e. an exorbitant amount of interest).20 According to the 
classical scholars, any benefit or increase (nominal or real), or any 
predetermined return on the loan capital advanced is riba and therefore 
prohibited.21 Consequently, any sum added to the principal from an 
exchange that is not reciprocated by an equivalent of value in return is 
riba.22 Their verdict is that the prohibition against interest is absolute, 
unambiguous and unconditional.23 
Modern scholars are, so to speak, "attempting to separate the chaff from 
the grain". The crux of their debate is about whether riba means interest or 
usury.24 If riba is defined as interest, any commercial transaction which 
requires the repayment of an amount additional to the capital is invalid under 
                                            
12  Sharawy 2001 GJICL 161. 
13  Swartz 2012 AJBM 10104.  
14  Swartz 2012 AJBM 10104.  
15  Iqbal "Financial Engineering" 10. 
16  Thomas "What is Riba" 140. 
17  Visser Islamic Finance 100.  
18  Irfan Heaven's Banker 60; Ginena and Hamid Foundations 40-42. 
19  Abdul-Rahman Art of RF 2; Sauer "Metaphysics and Economy" 155. 
20  Chapra 1984 HI 5. 
21  Saeed Islamic Banking 1.  
22  Sauer "Metaphysics and Economy" 154-155.  
23  Chapra 1984 HI 4. 
24 Khalil "Overview of Sharia" 55.  
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Sharia law. However, if riba simply means usury, as long as the rate of 
interest has not hit some rate which is determined to be exorbitant, it is 
valid.25 They begin by questioning a ban on riba in the modern-day 
economy.26 Their argument is that riba, as manifested in the Quran, is a 
very specific form of interest. Riba and interest are two different things, and 
the ban cannot therefore be applied to all forms of interest found in modern 
economies.27 They argue that the Quran verse quoted above is qualified by 
its reference to a specific amount of usury.28 In their view, the words 
"doubled or multiplied" connote that "interest is classified as riba if the 
principal repayable is double the original amount".29 What is banned by 
Sharia law, in their view, is "an unjustified increase" of return on a capital 
amount.30 Their view of the ban on riba in the Quran and Sunnah is different 
from that of the classical scholars. Rather than defining it literally, they look 
at the rationale for the injunction as a ban on exploitative forms of interest 
which have the effect of committing economic injustices against the poor, 
contrary to Sharia law.31 They support their position by arguing that the ban 
on riba is a ban on usuriously high and excessive interest, which is not 
equated with interest per se.32 Unlike the classical scholars, in their view the 
ban on interest is conditional and not absolute.33 Notwithstanding their 
different views on riba, there is a consensus amongst Muslim scholars that 
Sharia law prohibits riba.34 They differ only in terms of what qualifies as 
prohibited riba, and not necessarily on whether or not Sharia law prohibits 
it.35 
Alongside the prohibition on riba, as argued by the classical scholars, 
Islamic law also prohibits the additional penalty interest imposed on 
defaulting customers who fail to meet their obligations.36 Any additional 
amount claimed after the contract is agreed upon (such as an increase in 
price, default interest levied for late payment, and an early payment penalty) 
is also unlawful and prohibited as riba.37 According to contemporary 
Muslims, however, Sharia law allows a claim for compensation arising from 
                                            
25 Khalil "Overview of Sharia" 55. 
26  Visser Islamic Finance 36.  
27  Visser Islamic Finance 36. 
28  Irfan Heaven's Banker 63. 
29  Irfan Heaven's Banker 63. 
30  Irfan Heaven's Banker 63. 
31  Irfan Heaven's Banker 63. 
32  Visser Islamic Finance 38; Sauer "Metaphysics and Economy" 154. 
33  Sauer "Metaphysics and Economy" 155. 
34  Zuhayli "Juridical Meaning of Riba" 27. 
35  Fisho-Oridedi 2009 CEPMLPAR 5; Khalil "Overview of Sharia" 55. 
36  Hatta and Samah 2015 GJAT 12. 
37  Wahyudi et al Risk Management 113. 
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the actual loss suffered by the financier due to a delay in payment (ta'widh), 
as well as the penalty charges imposed for such a delay, without the need 
to prove the actual loss (gharamah).38 Such penalties can be charged, 
provided that the money is given to charity and is not income for the 
creditor.39 
2.2  Permissible financial products in terms of Sharia law 
If the financial system were based on adherence to the classical position 
and the prohibition against levying interest on loans, this would raise a 
simple question: how would lenders be able to yield positive returns from 
the capital amounts that they advanced, without contravening Islamic law? 
In particular, are there any halal alternatives to the charging of interest on 
loans? Islamic law provides few modes of financing which serve as a 
replacement for the prohibitions against riba-based financing. The bulk of 
these modes of financing derive from financial instruments that are 
"engineered" on the basis of the profit and loss sharing principle (PLS) and 
asset-based financing, which have become primary characteristics of 
Islamic banking.40 To understand what each of these financial instruments 
actually entails, one needs to understand the PLS principle upon which they 
are based. 
2.2.1  PLS-based Islamic financial instruments 
The PLS principle stems from the promotion of profit from trade and 
productive investments under the Sharia law.41 This principle generally 
means that the lender must share in the profits and losses arising out of the 
project for which the money was lent.42 What is objectionable in terms of the 
prohibition against riba, as previously indicated, is not the payment of profit, 
but a pre-determined rate of return that is not the result of the profits and 
losses incurred by either party to a financial transaction.43 This principle 
helps to draw a distinction between a prohibited riba and a legitimate return 
on investment. It recognises the use of an expected rate of return which is 
based on the risk that may arise from the operation of a financial 
transaction.44 To implement this principle and be Sharia compliant, some 
forms of financial arrangements have been developed which are consistent 
                                            
38  Wahyudi et al Risk Management 113. 
39  Baele, Farooq and Ongena 2012 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6654624.pdf. 
40  Siddiqui "Islamic Banking" 74. 
41  Mirakor and Zaidi "Profit-and-Loss Sharing" 51. 
42 Kettell Islamic Finance 5. 
43  Mirakor and Zaidi "Profit-and-Loss Sharing" 51. 
44  Iqbal "Financial Engineering" 10. 
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with encouraging trade and profit. What is evident from the literature is that 
all parties to a financial transaction need not share in both profit and loss. 
In certain transactions, one party (mostly the financier) may fully shoulder 
the risk of loss.45 As correctly stated, "[the] underlying idea is that Quran … 
prohibits riba but applauds trade and profit, which is not frowned upon".46 
As a result, there are numerous financial instruments that have been 
accepted as Sharia-compliant and which have become the core of Islamic 
finance today. The relevant permissible Islamic banking products are 
discussed below. 
The most recognised equity-based Islamic financial instruments, based on 
the PLS principle, are the mudarabah (trust financing) and musharakah 
(partnership financing).47 Both are based on the idea of partnership: a 
passive partnership in the case of mudarabah and an active one in the case 
of musharakah.48 Mudarabah is defined as a type of partnership where one 
party - a financier or a bank - supplies the capital, while the other party 
provides the expertise, management and labour.49 It is called "trust 
financing" because the financier entrusts his or her finance or investment to 
another party.50 If the project results in profit, they share it in pre-determined 
proportions. If it results in a loss, the entire loss is borne solely by the 
financier, and the entrepreneur gains no benefit out of his or her effort.51 
Musharakah, unlike mudarabah, is purely a partnership financial instrument. 
It refers to a partnership agreement between two or more parties, in which 
the partners contribute either capital or labour in order to carry out a joint 
venture.52 Unlike mudarabah, both parties contribute the capital and both 
have management rights in the project.53 In a musharakah, both parties 
share in the profit according to a pre-agreed formula. Losses, however, are 
shared strictly according to their respective contributions to the 
partnership.54 Although partnership based on the PLS principle is highly 
recommended under the Sharia law, it is not always easy to find partners to 
create a joint venture, in order to obtain financing. 
                                            
45  Visser Islamic Finance 53. 
46  Visser Islamic Finance 66. 
47  Hassan, Kayed and Oseni Introduction 104. 
48  Hassan, Kayed and Oseni Introduction 104.  
49  Hussain Islamic Banking 245. 
50  Alrifai Islamic Finance 125. 
51  Fakir and Tkiouat 2016 IJEFI 221; Hassan, Kayed and Oseni Introduction 105. 
52  Morapi Islamic Banking in South Africa 7. 
53  Qasaymeh 2011 CILSA 281. 
54  Kettell Islamic Finance 25. 
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Islamic law also recognises another financing instrument called murabaha 
(cost plus). Murabaha is debt-like, asset-based financing, in terms of which 
a customer requests the financial institution to purchase an asset for him or 
her and then sells it to the customer at an agreed price.55 In terms of this 
agreement, the financial institution buys a product or asset at the request of 
the buyer in the market at its own cost56 and for its own account.57 The 
financial institution takes legal possession of the asset and later sells it to 
the buyer at cost plus a mark-up.58 By taking possession of the financed 
property, the financial institution bears the risk during the period between 
purchasing the property and reselling it to the customer.59 One of the key 
features of murabaha, which distinguishes it from a conventional loan, is 
that one cannot receive cash as a subject of the agreement.60 In a 
murabaha transaction, the agreed sale price of the asset consists of the 
amount of financing and a predetermined profit margin.61 This mark-up profit 
is generally not regarded as interest, simply because the financial institution 
is not giving a loan to the customer, but selling the goods to the customer 
at a profit.62 At first glance, financing in terms of murabaha looks like a 
conventional loan, admitting the prohibited interest as cost plus profit 
through the back door. In support of this position, it is argued that the credit 
price charged by a financial institution, which includes a pre-specified profit 
margin, is parallel to a prohibited riba with similar characteristics to the one 
charged in conventional financing.63 The reason for its acceptability, 
however, is that it has an "asset-for-money" character rather than a 
prohibited "money-for-money" character. In terms of murabaha, the financial 
institution does not lend the borrower money and ask for the money over 
time plus a profit in addition to the loan capital.64 By buying the asset and 
then reselling it at a higher price, the financial institution takes a risk 
associated with the possibility of a sudden fall in price, which could see the 
buyer refusing to accept the asset at the agreed higher price.65 It is acting 
as a seller rather than a moneylender.66 The additional profit is not 
associated with the lending of money but with the buying and selling of the 
                                            
55  Hanif 2011 IJBSS 174; Hassan, Kayed and Oseni Introduction 82. 
56  Irfan Heaven's Banker 135. 
57  Visser Islamic Finance 66. 
58  Hussain Islamic Banking 245. 
59  El-Gamal "Paradox" 294. 
60  Hanif 2011 IJBSS 170. 
61  Hussain Islamic Banking 245. 
62  Jalil 2010 IJBSS 226. 
63  El-Gamal "Paradox" 292. 
64  Alrifai Islamic Finance 128. 
65  Alrifai Islamic Finance 128. 
66  Alrifai Islamic Finance 128. 
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asset.67 The acquisition of assets is the key element of murabaha which 
distinguishes it from the normal consumption interest-based loan, which is 
prohibited under Sharia law.68 
2.2.2  Wakalah (agency) contracts as an ancillary to PLS contracts 
Each of the above financial products may be offered on its own or with 
others as hybrid products. One of the permissible contracts recognised as 
the most frequently accessed form of contract in all major Islamic financial 
agreements is known as wakalah (agency). Literally, wakalah means 
looking after, taking custody, or applying skill on behalf of others.69 Its 
operational models are twofold: they consist of pure wakalah and a 
combination of, for instance, mudarabah and wakalah.70 In a pure wakalah, 
the agent (wakil) is not entitled to a profit in a PLS contract, but to an agreed 
agency fee based on his or her duties.71 The principal (mutawakkil) bears 
the risks associated with the transaction. Exceptions are those that arise 
from the agent's negligence or misconduct.72 In a combined mudarabah and 
wakalah, the agent is entitled to both an agent's fee for the efforts taken in 
managing the investment project, and to a share of the profit at an agreed 
ratio, once the investment has realised any such profit.73 In order to be 
Sharia compliant, the wakalah agreement must not involve any of the 
prohibited practices, including the prohibition against riba. Like other Islamic 
financial contracts, wakalah (pure or combined) may be used as a "legal 
device" (hilah, or hiyal in the plural) in order to achieve certain objectives 
through legal means.74 Although these objectives may be lawful or unlawful, 
hiyal are mostly used when it would be impossible to attain one's objective 
without violating the law.75 In most cases, these legal stratagems are used 
in Islamic financing to circumvent the prohibition against riba, in order to 
frustrate the objectives of Sharia law.76 For instance, parties may decide on 
a loan agreement without a predetermined interest so as to circumvent the 
prohibition against levying interest, by also entering into an agent 
agreement with the lender (as the agent), who is entitled to an excessive 
agency fee. The test for whether or not a particular legal device is lawful 
                                            
67  Alrifai Islamic Finance 128. 
68  Abdul-Rahman Art of RF 264. 
69  Ayub Understanding Islamic Finance 347; Nuhtay and Salman 2013 IJBSS 129. 
70  Ab'Aziz Islamic Banking in Malaysia 103. 
71  Ab'Aziz Islamic Banking in Malaysia 103. 
72  Qaed 2014 JRHSS 73. 
73  Hasan "Structured Products" 223. 
74  Horii 2002 ILS 313. 
75  Horii 2002 ILS 313. 
76  Mansoori 2011 JIBM 71. 
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depends on whether or not the purpose of such a device is simply to 
overcome the rigidity and inconvenience of any prohibition in terms of the 
Islamic law.77 The motive of the parties thus determines the legality or 
illegality of the contract.78 The relevant question that must be asked in the 
context of Islamic banking and finance is "whether the legal device used 
amounts to a trick or deception in order to open a back door for prohibited 
riba".79 This note will now discuss the facts of the case and how the SCA 
dealt with these principles as they arose in the factual disputes between the 
parties. 
3  The facts in the Lodhi SCA case 
The facts in the Lodhi SCA case arose from a relationship between the first 
appellant, Lodhi 5 Properties Investment CC ("Lodhi 5"), and the 
respondent, FirstRand Bank Limited ("FirstRand"). Lodhi 5 is one entity 
within the Lodhi Group. Another entity within the group is Lodhi 4 Properties 
Investments (Pty) Ltd ("Lodhi 4"), the second appellant. The third appellant, 
Mr Lodhi, is the sole member of Lodhi 5, which conducts the business 
involving rare and fine art, sporting goods, auctioneering and textile 
industries.80 FirstRand offers to its Islamic customers specialised services 
and products that are compliant with Sharia law, in addition to its 
conventional banking products.81 One of the products offered to Islamic 
customers is called Islamic Finance Residential Property Offering.82 This 
involves an agency agreement that allows FirstRand to act as an agent 
when purchasing property on behalf of its customers in return for a fixed 
agency fee.83 
In 2008 FirstRand loaned a sum of R9,6 million to Lodhi 5 in terms of an 
interest-free loan agreement.84 The amount was loaned for the purchase of 
two properties in Kramerville, Johannesburg. This agreement provided that 
the loan amount would be repayable in 120 monthly instalments of R88 000. 
The parties also entered into an "Agency and Administration Service 
Agreement" in terms of which FirstRand acted as Lodhi 5's exclusive agent 
and purchased the property on the latter's behalf.85 In return, Lodhi 5 would 
                                            
77  Mansoori 2011 JIBM 70.  
78  Rosly and Sanusi 1999 http://www.kantakji.com/media/8076/o113.pdf. 
79  Razak 2015 EJIF 7. 
80 Lodhi SCA para 2. 
81  Lodhi SCA para 3. 
82 Lodhi SCA para 3. 
83 Lodhi SCA para 3. 
84 Lodhi SCA para 3. 
85 Lodhi SCA para 6. 
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pay an additional 8% administration fee to FirstRand, which was also 
payable in 120 monthly instalments.86 
As security for its indebtedness, Lodhi 4 and Mr Lodhi also executed a 
suretyship agreement in FirstRand's favour. In terms of this agreement, Mr 
Lodhi and Lodhi 4 would be liable to pay FirstRand all amounts owing in the 
event that Lodhi 5 was unable to perform its obligations under the loan 
agreement and agency agreement.87 A covering mortgage bond was also 
registered over one of the properties in favour of the bank.88 Lodhi 5 made 
regular payments in discharge of the loan until September 2009.89 It later 
made a payment of R5 million in May 2010 towards the discharge of the 
loan from the insurance pay-out resulting from a fire which destroyed the 
building purchased through the loan granted to Lodhi 5.90 No further 
payments were made thereafter. 
Following these defaults in payment, FirstRand sent letters of demand to 
the appellants between April and May 2011, requesting them to make 
payments within 21 days from the dates of these letters, failing which they 
would be placed in mora and deemed unable to pay their debts.91 
Notwithstanding, none of the appellants responded to these letters. As a 
result, FirstRand launched an application in the HC to place Lodhi 5 and 
Lodhi 4 under final winding-up, and for Mr Lodhi to pay the outstanding 
amount on the loan.92 FirstRand relied on both the loan agreement and 
agency agreement alleging that Lodhi 5 had fallen into arrears in terms of 
both agreements. It alleged that the sums of R3 609 331, 52 and R6 773 
242, 73 remained owing as capital in terms of the loan agreement, and the 
balance of administration fees in terms of the agency agreement, 
respectively.93  
4  The main issues 
4.1  The issues and the decision in the High Court 
The parties approached the HC in three applications.94 The first two related 
applications involved placing Lodhi 4 and Lodhi 5 under final winding-up 
                                            
86 Lodhi SCA para 6; Lodhi HC para 19. 
87 Lodhi SCA para 3. 
88 Lodhi SCA para 3. 
89 Lodhi SCA para 4. 
90 Lodhi SCA para 4. 
91 Lodhi SCA para 5. 
92 Lodhi SCA para 6. 
93 Lodhi SCA para 6. 
94 Lodhi HC para 1. 
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based on their actual and deemed inability to repay their debtors in terms of 
the provisions of the old Companies Act95 and the Close Corporations Act.96 
The court, per Molefe J, approved these applications on the basis of the 
alleged failure by these companies to respond to the letters of demand and 
to make payments in terms thereof. It also looked at their financial 
statements and concluded that each company's annual income "equate[d] 
to just over one month's repayment in terms of the loan agreement", 
excluding the payment of operating expenses.97 This was sufficient proof 
that they were unable to pay their debts.98 The third application, which is 
important for the purpose of this discussion, relates to the money judgment 
against Mr Lodhi. In this regard FirstRand relied on the terms of the 
suretyship agreement. It argued that in the event that Lodhi 5 was placed 
under winding-up, Mr Lodhi would have no defence against FirstRand's 
claim and would be liable to make payment in terms of the suretyship 
agreement.99 
The appellants did not deny the existence of a valid agency agreement.100 
However, they denied that any of the fees stipulated in the agreement were 
due and payable.101 They raised several defences to support this position. 
Firstly, they invoked exceptio non adimpleti contractus and argued that 
FirstRand was not entitled to payment, as it did not render its own quid pro 
quo.102 In particular, they argued that FirstRand had rendered no 
performance to earn any agency fee. Secondly, and related to the first 
defence, they invoked an alleged suspensive condition which has the effect 
of bringing both the loan and the agency agreements into effect upon 
signature by all parties.103 They also alleged that a second offer to purchase 
had to be signed by the appellants and the seller in relation to the purchases 
of the two properties.104 As none of these conditions had been fulfilled, they 
argued that FirstRand was not entitled to any agency fee.105 
The third defence is important and requires closer examination. According 
to the appellants, the "fees" claimed by FirstRand under the agency 
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agreement were "nothing but 'riba'".106 As a result, the only amount due and 
payable was the outstanding capital amount in terms of the loan 
agreement.107 The argument with regard to the "riba" defence related to a 
clause in the loan agreement which provided that their transactions should 
be compliant with Sharia law, particularly the prohibition against the 
charging of interest.108 They argued that the agency agreement amounted 
to the charging of the prohibited riba, which rendered it illegitimate. The 
essence of the argument was that the whole transaction was not Sharia-
compliant. The defendants finally argued that FirstRand failed to meet its 
obligations in accordance with Sharia law, as the agreements were not 
explained to Mr Lodhi, but were based on the assumption that they would 
be entered into on the basis of the benefits of profit and risk sharing.109 The 
written agreements therefore conflicted with the understanding of Mr Lodhi's 
"intention of the loan transaction".110 For reasons that are discussed below, 
the appellants were unsuccessful in their defence, and therefore appealed 
to the SCA against both the winding-up and money judgment orders. 
4.2  The issues and the decision in the SCA 
The main issues on appeal were crystallised into the following questions: 
whether or not (a) Lodhi 4 and Lodhi 5 were correctly placed under winding-
up; (b) the appeal should succeed partially by the reduction of the amount 
owed by Mr Lodhi to the outstanding capital amount; and (c) Mr Lodhi was 
liable to pay interest on such an amount, and if so, from which date. The 
SCA upheld the HC's ruling on the winding-up question for the same 
reasons. The discussion will therefore focus on the other questions raised 
on appeal, as they are relevant to the defences raised in relation to 
compliance with Sharia law and the prohibition of riba. 
5  The decisions in the High Court and the SCA 
The main factual issue involved in this case was whether or not FirstRand 
was entitled to the restitution of the money advanced in terms of the loan 
agreement and, if so, whether or not the appellants were obliged to pay 
back the capital amount together with any additional amount. Secondly, 
whether or not it was entitled to any agency fee for the work done under the 
agency agreement. The issue whether or not any amount was due and 
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payable depended on whether or not the court upheld any of the defences 
raised by the appellants. In both the HC and the SCA the courts agreed on 
the winding-up of Lodhi 4 and Lodhi 5.111 Both courts also ordered Mr Lodhi 
to pay FirstRand the money that was due and payable, together with 
interest.112 However, for reasons that are discussed below, the courts 
differed on the amounts and reasons for such payments. They also differed 
in terms of the reasons whether or not these transactions were Sharia 
compliant. 
In order to address the question regarding the reduction of the loan amount 
and the possible liability for interest, the SCA (as had the HC) had also to 
address the question as to whether or not the debt claimed was due and 
payable. The appellants did not deny that a certain amount of the capital 
sum remained owing under these contracts. Their main contention was that 
FirstRand had not accelerated the repayment of instalments in terms of the 
loan agreement.113 Secondly, they argued that the payment of R5 million 
from the insurance proceeds amounted to the prepayment of 62 instalments 
and a year's worth of instalments in advance. Put differently, they were 
arguing that the payment made from the insurance effectively paid the 
monthly instalments for many months to come. Therefore, the full amount 
was not outstanding at the time of the application. Both the HC and the SCA 
disagreed with the argument pertaining to the acceleration of repayment. 
Both agreed with the bank's submission that a written notice by FirstRand 
to the applicants did actually reserve the right to declare all or part of the 
capital outstanding to be immediately due and payable and was therefore 
sufficient to accelerate the payment.114 As the HC correctly held, the "notice 
did declare that the outstanding balance is due and payable".115 The only 
right reserved, the court further held, "was to declare whether part or all the 
capital outstanding is due and payable".116 That is, once the letter of 
demand served to accelerate the payment, it was left to each party to raise 
the issue as to how much was immediately payable. 
Having decided that the amount was due and payable, the HC had to decide 
how much was payable. In this regard, it had to decide whether the money 
payable was only the outstanding capital amount or whether interest on that 
amount was payable and, if so, from which date. The applicants relied on 
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the following defence in this regard. They argued that FirstRand had failed 
to meet its obligation in terms of Sharia law because neither of the 
agreements had been explained to Mr Lodhi. As a result, he entered into 
these agreements with the understanding that they would be based on the 
sharing of profit, as well as any risk arising from the transactions.117 Their 
position was basically that both agreements were generally void for non-
compliance with Sharia law. They argued that the bank was not entitled to 
any interest as the agency fee "amounted to interest in breach of Shari'ah 
law".118 Both the HC and the SCA dealt with this issue, but the HC analysed 
the applicable principles in more detail than the SCA. It dealt both with the 
issue of Sharia compliance and the issue of the interest that was payable. 
The HC looked at the fact that Mr Lodhi implemented all the transactions 
and accepted the benefits (of purchasing the house with the loan money 
and the extinguishing of existing debts).119 It also took into account the 
personality of Mr Lodhi as "an astute businessman".120 It further questioned 
Mr Lodhi's failure to explain why he knowingly, and applying Islamic 
principles, read and signed the agreements without any protest "if they were 
not Sharia compliant with his religious beliefs".121 It therefore found his 
defence to be far-fetched and untenable.122 This issue was not brought on 
appeal to the SCA as the parties limited their appeal to the questions of the 
winding-up and the amount payable.123 
With regard to the amount that FirstRand was reclaiming, the HC and the 
SCA approached this issue differently. Having discussed some of the forms 
of financial transaction which are Sharia-compliant (such as wakalah), the 
HC analysed whether or not the loan agreement was Sharia-compliant.124 It 
approached the matter by asking whether or not the loan transaction 
provided for a shared responsibility for profit and loss between the borrower 
and the lender.125 After analysing both the loan and agency transactions, 
the HC concluded that the loan agreement between the parties was not a 
profit-sharing agreement.126 Its reason was that "[t]he only party benefiting 
from this transaction was the respondents" (as they were in the lower 
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court).127 It concluded that the transaction was a residential property offered 
with a fixed agency fee.128 As a result it held, rather surprisingly, that the 
loan and agency agreements were Sharia-compliant.129 It ordered Mr Lodhi 
to repay FirstRand a cumulative amount of R10 328 574,25 plus interest on 
the said amount, at the rate of 15.5% per annum calculated from the 18 April 
until date of the payment.130 
The SCA also arrived at a similar decision. It ordered Mr Lodhi to repay 
FirstRand an amount of R2 642 006.95, together with interest thereon at the 
rate of 15.5% per annum from 15 June 2012 to the date of the appeal.131 
The SCA agreed with FirstRand's position that Mr Lodhi was liable for 
interest on the reduced sum at the legal rate of 15.5% at the material time. 
The SCA approached this issue by questioning the nature or the type of 
interest charged in terms of the agreements between the parties.132 It held 
that the interest sought by FirstRand was not based on the enforcement of 
a contractual undertaking.133 In the court's view, this interest was based on 
Lodhi's default in payment.134 It reasoned that the interest was mora interest 
intended to compensate the party who suffered a loss as a result of "being 
deprived of the use of the capital for a period of time".135 According to the 
SCA, the interest constituted damage that flowed naturally from the contract 
itself, due to a failure to perform a contractual obligation within the agreed 
time.136 In the SCA's view, this obligation had "nothing to do with and is not 
affected by the Sharia law's prohibition against payment of interest on a loan 
debt".137 It therefore found Mr Lodhi liable to compensate FirstRand for its 
failure to perform by the due date at a legal rate of interest as prescribed by 
section 1(2) of the Prescribed Rates of Interest Act.138 
6  Critical analysis 
The decision in Lodhi 5 SCA thought to illustrate an eagerness in our courts 
to adjudicate on matters relating to Islamic law. Islamic banking law is 
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already part of South African law.139 The law has, however, yet to be given 
detailed explication by our courts. This poses a question as to whether our 
courts, which are grounded in the common law, are willing to adopt and 
apply the principles of Islamic banking in South African law. The HC in this 
case has, to a minimal extent, reached its decision by infusing some 
principles of Islamic banking law into its deliberations. However, it still left 
unanswered many relevant questions arising from the facts. The parties in 
this case had agreed that the agreement between them would be governed 
by Sharia law but they had failed to agree on the specific principles of Sharia 
law applicable to their agreement. As a result, there were questions that 
were left for judicial interpretation by the courts. 
The first question that the SCA had to address was whether FirstRand was 
entitled to charge interest in addition to the capital. It is apparent that the 
parties intended that the agreement should be governed by Sharia law. As 
the SCA correctly approached the matter, it had to decide on whether or not 
these transactions were Sharia compliant. This raised the question as to 
whether or not FirstRand was entitled to anything more than the loan capital 
in terms of Sharia law. This question pertains to what Sharia law actually 
permits. The SCA (like the HC) was reluctant to attempt to interpret what 
the prohibition against riba entails. The HC's dismissal of the appellant's 
claim was based on its acceptance that Mr Lodhi implemented the entire 
transaction and accepted the benefits without any protest.140 The court in 
this regard was able to expose the scope of possible abuses by defaulting 
debtors, who use the argument of the invalidity of Islamic law to avoid 
making payments in terms of transactions governed by this law. However, 
the HC's position that a financial transaction is permissible under Sharia law 
only if all parties share in the profit and loss in terms of the PLS principle is 
questionable. As indicated earlier, in certain transactions, loss can be borne 
fully by only one party.141 This principle does not entail that profit always be 
shared among the parties. It simply requires that a financial transaction 
should have the sharing of profit and loss as its main aim. As a result, the 
sharing of profit and loss is not in itself the end, but only the means to a 
Sharia-compliant transaction. With respect, the HC erred by applying the 
PLS principle as a precondition for compliance with Sharia law. Despite 
holding that the parties did not share in the profit and loss in terms of the 
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loan agreement, the HC further concluded, surprisingly, that the loan and 
agency agreements were Sharia-compliant. The question that remains is 
how these agreements can be thought to be Sharia-compliant if, in the 
court's view, all parties do not share in the profit and loss. 
Likewise, the SCA avoided addressing the main issue before it, which was 
whether or not Sharia law applied to the transactions. It also did not deal 
with the question as to whether an additional amount claimed constituted a 
prohibited riba. Arguably, this was a question that required the Court to take 
the position of either the classical school or the contemporary Muslim school 
in this regard. Taking the former position would have led to the conclusion 
that FirstRand was entitled to the advanced capital amount only. The 
respondent would have been liable for only the outstanding capital amount 
advanced by the bank. Even taking the contemporary Muslim scholars' 
approach would not yield a different result. FirstRand did not, as the SCA 
concluded, claim interest based on the enforcement of a contractual 
undertaking.142 The interest claimed was not in the nature of interest agreed 
upon in a contract, but the claim was based on the default of payment by a 
debtor. If the claim had been based on the enforcement of a contractual 
undertaking, the position of contemporary scholars would have been 
relevant. The court would be called upon to decide whether or not the chaff 
could be separated from the grain: in other words, whether or not an 
acceptable amount of additional profit could be separated from the 
prohibited exorbitant interest. Instead, the court decided the matter by 
looking at the nature of the interest claimed. It is submitted that the SCA 
ignored the parties' intention to subject their agreement to Sharia law.  
Another question that the SCA left unanswered was whether or not the 
charging of mora interest in transactions subject to Sharia law is enforceable 
in South African law. The SCA's view was that the liability of the debtor to 
compensate the creditor for failure to perform on the due date "has nothing 
to do with and is not affected by the Sharia law's prohibition against payment 
of interest on a loan debt".143 While the rights under common law cannot be 
denied by the application of Islamic law principles, the defence regarding 
riba was purely on the basis that Sharia law governed the agreement 
between the parties. Payment of this interest had to be decided in terms of 
what Sharia law permits. When applying Sharia law, the bank's claim for 
default interest in this case could not be regarded as either tawhid or 
gharamah. There is no indication that the claim for default interest would not 
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constitute an additional income to FirstRand, nor is there any indication that 
the money would be given to charity, as suggested by contemporary Islamic 
scholars. Therefore the SCA's focus on attempting to establish the type of 
interest in question was totally unrelated to the parties' intention that the 
agreement should be governed by Sharia law. 
Having decided on the nature of the interest claimed under the loan 
agreement, the SCA further failed to address the question as to whether or 
not the fees under the agency agreement constituted riba, as claimed. This 
failure denied the parties an opportunity to address their dispute on this 
point. In order to rule on this question, the court would first have had to 
address the defence of exceptio non adimpleti contractus. If successful, this 
defence would allow the appellants to withhold the payment of agency fees 
until FirstRand had performed in terms of the agency agreement. This 
defence, however, would still not hold any ground, as FirstRand actually 
purchased the properties on behalf of the respondents, who subsequently 
registered a mortgage bond over the properties.144 If it were accepted that 
there was a quid pro quo on behalf of FirstRand, it would have had to be 
determined whether or not the payment of the claimed agency fees would 
have constituted riba. This would have been purely a matter of interpretation 
of the Islamic law. The charging of agency fees is accepted by both classical 
and modern Muslim scholars, as already indicated.145 Unless the use of loan 
and agency agreements (as hybrid murabaha and wakalah) in this case 
could be regarded as hilah to circumvent the strict prohibition against riba 
under the loan agreement, by charging agency fees in terms of the agency 
agreement, FirstRand would be entitled to the agency fees once it was 
established that it had rendered performance in terms of this agreement. In 
this regard, the appellants would have needed to prove only that the agency 
agreement was intended to achieve an unlawful objective under the loan 
agreement, with the intention of circumventing the prohibition against riba. 
In the absence of this proof, the HC and the SCA were therefore correct in 
concluding that the agency agreement was Sharia-compliant, 
notwithstanding their failure to analyse the relevant principles in this regard. 
The agency fee was payable, as FirstRand has performed by buying the 
property on behalf of the appellants. 
The SCA's conclusion that the respondents' obligation to pay default interest 
had nothing to do with and was not affected by Sharia law's prohibition 
against the payment of interest also left much to be desired with regard to 
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the enforceability of Islamic law by our common law courts. This problem 
exists mostly in those jurisdictions in which the legal systems are secular, 
such as the United Kingdom. Common law is still dominant, as judicial 
officers lack the necessary expertise to address disputes arising in terms of 
the enforcement of Sharia law.146 As a result, the courts adopt a dismissive 
approach to the parties' choice of Sharia law as the governing law for their 
transactions. Expert views on Islamic law are often ignored in favour of the 
application of the national law.147 Contractual disputes are resolved by 
applying the law of the country in question, disregarding the intention of the 
parties and the commercial goals of Islamic finance law.148 
In the UK, for instance, leading cases149 involving murabaha agreements 
between the financial institutions and their customers provided for a choice 
of English law or "the principles of the Glorious Sharia" as the governing 
law. In these cases the UK courts accepted English law as the governing 
law and therefore ignored the intention of the parties to subject their 
agreement to Sharia principles. The attitude of English courts towards the 
enforcement of Islamic banking law is exemplified by Potter150 as follow: 
It was improbable in the extreme, that the parties were truly asking the English 
court to get into the matters of Islamic religion and orthodoxy. 
The court further characterised the reference to Sharia law as being simply 
a reference to Islamic religious principles for conducting banking business, 
rather than to a system of law which could trump the application of English 
law.151 In justifying its stance, the court relied heavily on the existence of 
controversy arising from the existence of various schools of thought 
regarding the application of Islamic law.152 Controversial as the approach of 
the UK courts is, they have made their standpoint on the enforcement of 
Sharia law quite clear: English law trumps Sharia law in conflict of law 
matters. The position in South Africa, however, remains unclear. The 
approach by the HC seems to hold out a "jurisprudential promise" of 
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interpreting and enforcing Islamic law. Its pronouncement about the 
requirements of a PLS principle is an indication that the court is willing to 
entertain disputes relating to the enforcement of financial transactions 
governed by Islamic law. However, the decision of the SCA flies in the face 
of this approach. To reiterate, the judicial officers in Lodhi SCA were 
arguably called upon to enforce the agreements between the parties in 
accordance with Islamic law, as the parties intended. However, the SCA 
chose to address the main question as to whether or not the agreements 
involved a prohibited riba outside the scope of the governing clause of the 
loan agreement between the parties by asking whether or not default 
interest was payable due to the loss, which is "compensated by an award 
of mora interest".153 The SCA was implicitly adopting the English approach 
of applying the common law applicable to banking law in South Africa, 
instead of the Islamic law chosen by the parties. Unlike the English courts, 
the HC and the SCA did not call for experts on Sharia law to advise on the 
possible solution to this dispute. As the Malaysian Appeal Court correctly 
pronounced: 
… judges in civil court[s] should not take upon themselves to declare whether 
the matter is in accordance to the Religion of Islam or otherwise as it needs 
consideration by eminent jurists who are properly qualified in the field of 
Islamic jurisprudence.154 
Unless such matters can be referred to available specialised forums, they 
definitely calls for the opinion of experts who could provide insight into the 
Islamic principles at play in such cases. One should, however, acknowledge 
that there are differences in matters of the interpretation of Islamic law 
amongst Sharia experts. Civil courts should nevertheless be able to take 
into account different views and opinions and have the power to make a 
final determination on such matters. Their views are important when they 
adjudicate on issues that require the interpretation of Islamic law. The SCA 
in this case should have invited experts in Sharia law to assist with the 
adjudication of the issues before it. Had the SCA based its decision on the 
governing law in terms of the agreement between the parties, it would not 
have been necessary to conclude that Mr Lodhi was liable for default 
interest. Its failure to apply or pronounce on its position regarding the 
enforcement and interpretation of the governing law clause in this case 
leaves open the question as to whether or not parties to financial 
agreements governed by Islamic law can rely on the courts for the resolution 
of their disputes. This question that will remain open until another similar 
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issue comes before our courts, and they are willing to guide us on the 
enforceability of Islamic banking law. The SCA's reluctance to entertain this 
question also leaves open other questions regarding the contents of the 
agreements by the parties in terms of Islamic law. These questions include 
the following: what the ambit of the riba prohibitions is (the question of 
whether the chaff can be separated from the grain); whether or not hybrid 
loan and agency agreements are simply unlawful legal devices (hiyal) 
meant to circumvent the strictness of Sharia law; and whether or not the 
Islamic Finance Residential Property Offering (as provided to the appellants 
in this case) as well as agency fees charged in terms of an agency 
agreement are Sharia-compliant under South African law. 
7  Conclusion 
The decision in Lodhi 5 SCA provides some lessons to both parties entering 
into transactions incorporating Sharia law as the governing law, as well as 
to judicial officers regarding the challenges in terms of enforcing this law. To 
the former, a simple lesson is the reluctance of our secular courts to accept 
the application of Islamic finance principles. This reluctance creates 
challenges with regard to which forum is capable of addressing disputes 
arising from transactions based on Islamic finance principles. This 
reluctance is evident in this case, as the court did not address the dispute 
between the parties in terms of their choice of law. What is evident in this 
judgement is that the court had no knowledge of what the principles of 
Sharia law are. The SCA's failure to invite experts in Sharia law to provide 
guidance on the applicable Islamic law remains a cause for concern, 
particularly in terms of whether or not parties can in future expect our courts 
to enforce agreements based on Islamic law. As already indicated, the court 
failed to take a stand on whether or not it might enforce Islamic law. It could 
also not address several questions that were posed to it such as the content 
of a riba prohibition, and whether or not agency fees in terms of wakala 
agreements as well as the use of hybrid contracts of murabaha and wakala 
(as in this case) are Sharia-compliant. These questions will remain 
unanswered until another similar case comes before our courts. 
South African courts need to clearly indicate whether or not they are willing 
to enforce and apply Islamic finance law as the governing law of a particular 
transaction.  
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